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Overcoming the Great Forgetting: 
A Comment on Fishkin and Forbath 
Jedediah Purdy 
Fishkin and Forbath’s (F&F’s) manuscript1 is a project of recovery.  It 
portrays the present as a time marked by a “Great Forgetting” of a tradition 
of constitutional political economy.  F&F name what has been forgotten the 
“democracy of opportunity” tradition.  Recovering it would mean again 
treating the following three principles as linked elements at the core of our 
Constitution: (1) an anti-oligarchy principle that works to prevent wealth 
from producing grossly unequal political power; (2) a commitment to a 
broad middle class with secure, respected work; and (3) a principle of 
inclusion that opens participation in both citizenship and the economic 
middle class to all, particularly members of historically excluded groups. 
This kind of recovery project is also a certain form of imaginative 
literature.  In the spirit of Langston Hughes’s poetic call to “let America be 
America again”—meaning, let America become the country it has never 
been but always should have been2—it invites us to envision and identify 
with a counterfactual country, also called the United States, with the same 
constitutional text as ours and much of the same history.  What kind of 
laws, what kind of public culture, and what kind of judges would that 
country have?  This kind of counterfactual narration, like various genres of 
intentional fiction (sci-fi, utopian literature, and counterfactual history), 
helps readers get our own world, the actual world, into better focus by 
deliberately changing a few key aspects of it and asking what else might 
follow.  In F&F’s hands, it is also a hortatory and reforming project, urging 
us readers, much as Hughes did, to put our shoulders to the wheel of 
constitutional change. 
I emphasize this resemblance to counterfactual history and other 
imaginative genres in part because it should focus us on a question that is 
not central to F&F’s project but nonetheless invites attention.  At what 
juncture did our history diverge from that of a constitutional culture defined 
by the democracy of opportunity tradition?  How did we lose sight of that 
tradition?  What forces and events drove it into retreat?  This matters 
 
 Robinson O. Everett Professor of Law, Duke Law School.  I thank Joey Fishkin and Willy 
Forbath for their terrific manuscript and all the participants in and organizers of the Texas Law 
Review conference thereon.  I am especially indebted to David Grewal, Jeremy Kessler, and 
Sabeel Rahman for their conversation.  All errors are mine. 
1. JOSEPH FISHKIN & WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE ANTI-OLIGARCHY CONSTITUTION 
(forthcoming 2017) (on file with the Texas Law Review). 
2. LANGSTON HUGHES, Let America Be America Again (1936), reprinted in THE COLLECTED 
POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 189–91 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., 1995). 
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because what we take the answer to be will bear on the viability and the 
manner of a project of recovery like this one, oriented to the tropes of 
constitutional speech and reasoning. 
But before turning to that tradition, let’s take up the standpoint of the 
democracy of opportunity tradition and examine the present constitutional 
landscape from that vantage.  From the standpoint of this tradition, many 
recent developments in constitutional law look seriously out of whack.  
Allowing the First Amendment to lay waste to campaign-spending limits 
flies in the face of the anti-oligarchy principle.3  Blocking Medicaid 
expansion (and nearly invalidating the Obamacare individual mandate) on 
federalism grounds hobbles Washington’s role in protecting basic security 
for a broad middle class.4  Imposing constitutional opt-outs on public-sector 
union-dues schemes would have torn another hole in the tattered 
institutional architecture of a middle-class economy (and of politically 
empowered worker–citizens).5  Interpreting Equal Protection doctrine in a 
narrow, anticlassification key (a.k.a. colorblindness) implies constitutional 
indifference to the structures of wealth and opportunity that stand in the 
way of robust inclusion, and even impedes race-conscious efforts to achieve 
inclusion (i.e., affirmative action).6 
But, F&F observe, progressives—especially when working with 
constitutional doctrine, that is, when self-consciously being constitutional 
lawyers—tend not to think of these as constitutional issues, except in a 
negative sense: we say, echoing the New Deal Justices, that these are 
questions where the courts do not belong, where legislatures are 
constitutionally authorized to act.  Armed with the democracy of 
opportunity tradition, we could say more: that legislatures are implementing 
a constitutional duty to build a democratic political economy.  It would 
follow that courts must not stop them, but also that every public official, 
 
3. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014) (striking down aggregate limits 
on individual campaign contributions on First Amendment grounds). 
4. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (holding that the 
Affordable Care Act’s provision granting the Secretary of Health and Human Services the ability 
to penalize states for not participating in the Medicaid expansion was not a valid exercise of 
congressional power). 
5. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222–26 (1977) (upholding the 
constitutional validity of compelling employees to pay for collective bargaining representation); 
Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 14-915, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2016) (affirming the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling that mandatory union fees were constitutional by an evenly divided Court).  
The Court appeared to be leaning toward deciding that it would be unconstitutional for public 
unions to charge fees to nonmembers, but the death of Justice Antonin Scalia resulted in 
Friedrichs being decided with an even split.  Matt Ford, A Narrow Escape for Public-Sector 
Unions, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/ 
03/friedrichs-supreme-court-decision/470103/ [https://perma.cc/A6MJ-537K]. 
6. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (noting that a benign or 
legitimate purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight in the strict scrutiny 
calculus of equal protection analysis). 
PURDY.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2016  12:17 PM 
2016] Overcoming the Great Forgetting 1417 
perhaps every citizen, has some responsibility to advance democracy of 
opportunity. 
This long-standing line of argument has a small but proud recent 
presence, in which Willy Forbath’s earlier work is central.7  It has recently 
taken new urgency from two developments.  One is the Supreme Court’s 
eagerness to advance a selective antiregulatory agenda on constitutional 
terms.  (All of the issues cited two paragraphs back are examples.)  Another 
is greatly increased awareness of accelerating economic inequality, which 
intensifies concerns about oligarchy, the state of the middle class, and the 
prospects of inclusion.  Today, it seems that there is much to do to protect, 
let alone advance, a democratic political economy, and, at the same time, 
newly devised constitutional barriers are impeding that work. 
I. The New Deal and LBJ’s Great Society 
 An especially timely aspect of this argument is the interpretation of the 
“Great Forgetting” in relation to the twentieth-century history of inequality.  
If one asked why the Constitution proves more useful to opponents of a 
democratic political economy than to its supporters, the obvious answer 
would be that it protects individual rights and state prerogatives, thus 
imposing limits on government (especially federal) power, but does not 
require any legislative initiative or protect robust “positive rights” (other 
than some that are necessary to core procedural protections, notably the 
right to a defense attorney).8  But, say F&F, this rather restrictive vision is 
not the only way to understand the Constitution; indeed, many earlier 
Americans would sharply disagree.9  They were our imperfect predecessors 
in the democracy of opportunity tradition.  How did even progressives 
today come to think so differently?  This is the question of the “Great 
Forgetting.” 
 
7. See William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 166–67 
(2001) [hereinafter Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile] (explaining that the New Dealers 
championed a vision of the Constitution that placed affirmative obligations on the political 
branches to facilitate the economic rights of all Americans); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of 
the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1209–14 (1989) [hereinafter Forbath, 
The Shaping of the American Labor Movement] (arguing that the American labor movement 
created an alternative constitutional vision, which was subsequently adopted by the nation’s elite 
and found embodiment in New Deal reforms). 
8. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (reaffirming that a person 
accused of a federal or state crime has the right to have counsel appointed if retained counsel 
cannot be obtained), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1970) (holding that, as a 
consequence of the Due Process Clause, evidentiary hearings must be provided to welfare 
recipients before their benefits are discontinued), with Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 625 
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that there is no absolute right to receive public 
assistance). 
9. See Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, supra note 7, at 166–67 (describing the 
New Deal constitutional paradigm of a Congress charged with safeguarding positive social and 
economic rights). 
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The story begins familiarly enough: the Supreme Court was the last 
holdout among the three branches in resisting FDR’s New Deal.10  Lawyers, 
judges, and law professors reacted to the Court’s involvement in politics 
with a theory of institutional competence and constitutional authority that 
largely wrote courts out of political economy, and out they stayed, for well 
over a generation.11  Courts instead set out on a program of rights-based 
inclusion, felling laws that infringed personal freedom and treated different 
people inequitably, from Brown12 to Obergefell13 (and from Buckley14 to 
Fisher15).  And the remit of this program, in the minds of progressives and 
pretty much everyone else, was just what constitutional law was: a scheme 
of rights-protecting and power-granting provisions that mostly authorized 
public action while securing individuals against overt exclusion or 
deprivation of core negative liberties.  Conservatives emphasized different 
liberties and interpreted the scheme of powers differently, but their 
Constitution was an alternative version of the liberal one, built to a different 
shape from the same parts.  Moreover, “the Constitution” came to be 
identified more and more with the constitutional law whose development 
liberal and conservative lawyers were contesting, that is, with the work of 
courts.  The idea that the Constitution contains a vision of social 
membership that legislatures must vindicate faded from view. 
Accordingly, the major progressive initiatives in political economy 
that followed the New Deal, notably LBJ’s Great Society, did not come 
sporting constitutional colors.  They were humanitarian, utilitarian, and 
managerial improvements, consistent with an increasingly technocratic 
view of political economy.16  In these respects, they were marked by a time 
of high and widely shared growth.  We now recognize that time as 
anomalous, but it then seemed that: (A) there was plenty of social surplus to 
 
10. NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES 92 (2010) (“Critics of the New Deal were claiming Roosevelt’s programs 
exceeded constitutional norms.  The Supreme Court was blocking the administration and Congress 
from implementing its most aggressive reforms, such as the [National Industrial Recovery Act].”). 
11. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1955) (establishing that “the 
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional”); Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate commodity prices via 
its power to regulate interstate commerce); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938) (articulating a general rule—and three limited exceptions thereto—that judicial 
deference to legislatures is appropriate when there is a rational basis for the legislature’s action); 
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of 
Washington State’s imposition of minimum wage regulations on private employers). 
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
13. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). 
15. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421–22 (2013). 
16. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 281–85 (1996) (describing Johnson’s “Great Society” and his vision to 
create a national community through federal programs). 
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deal around; (B) because a properly governed economy distributed its 
goods in a tolerably egalitarian way, inclusion plus social provision was the 
right formula to expand an extant, broad middle class.  
It was, accordingly, a time suited for a war on poverty, not a war on 
inequality; inequality—the problem at the heart of the anti-oligarchy and 
broad-middle-class principles of the democracy of opportunity tradition—
seemed resolved.  The distributive battles and questions about legitimacy 
that pressed earlier generations of progressives toward constitutional 
principles had relaxed.  It was easy to keep regarding the Constitution, 
1950s style, as a document of personal liberty and inclusion, the province of 
courts (which stayed out of the political economy field).  And so the 
tradition of democratic opportunity slept.  Now the hour is late, democratic 
political economy is under libertarian constitutional siege, and F&F sound 
the tocsin (or, if you are a Tolkien fan, light the beacons). 
I am an admirer and fellow traveler of this project.  Inspired partly by 
Forbath’s work, I argued for a democratic political economy in both 
property and constitutional law in 2005–2010,17 and more recently I’ve 
written about the Court’s antiregulatory jurisprudence (“neoliberal 
Lochnerism”)18 and, with David Grewal, about the origins of twentieth-
century legal liberalism in the “golden age of democratic capitalism” when 
the problems of inequality and democratic management of the economy 
briefly but pregnantly appeared solved.19  So it is in that spirit that I 
approach F&F’s project. 
II. False Confidence Inequality Had Been Contained 
So, what stopped the democracy of opportunity tradition from 
flourishing on into the twenty-first century and helping to secure a broadly 
democratic political economy as a constitutional value?  Let’s take as a 
starting point the interpretation of the “Great Forgetting” that I’ve just 
sketched: the anomalous appearance that inequality had been substantially 
controlled in the mid-twentieth century relaxed the pressures that had kept 
the tradition vital, facilitating the split of the inclusionary principle into a 
constitutional principle of its own, one that often works against democracy 
of opportunity.  This broad account of the mid-twentieth century, however, 
 
17. See, e.g., JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY: REBELS, REACTIONARIES, AND 
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 204–06 (2009) (stating that Holmes’s dictum in Lochner v. 
New York about the Constitution and economic theory obscures the idea of freedom and economic 
life); id. at 210–13 (arguing for more freedom with intellectual property); id. at 215 (arguing that a 
“more free world” requires answering which political and legal decisions could move citizens 
closer to that world). 
18. See generally Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New 
Economy, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 195. 
19. See generally David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and 
Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 1. 
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leaves open a pair of questions.  First, what forces played false the 
confidence that inequality had been contained at last?  Second, how did 
these developments in what you might call real, hard-core, or empirical 
political economy—as against the normative political economy of the 
democracy of opportunity tradition—play into the “Great Forgetting” 
within constitutional language?  What was the interaction between 
macroeconomic events and the direction of constitutional reasoning? 
This Essay is not the place to try to parse these questions, but I want to 
set them out to ensure that they are kept in view as the conversation about 
F&F’s important project continues.  Whatever set of answers one gives will 
bear on the likelihood that a revival of the language of the democracy of 
opportunity tradition can contribute to a larger recovery of that tradition, 
including an effective political response to growing inequality.  But for 
now, with that question in view, let’s return to the somewhat more tractable 
question of the change in language that F&F propose. 
III. The Relevance (if any) of the Democracy of Opportunity Tradition in 
Constitutional Adjudication 
The big, obvious question is what difference it makes to talk about the 
democracy of opportunity tradition as constitutional.  F&F point in two 
directions here: toward constitutional adjudication, on the one hand, and the 
constitutional rhetoric and imagination of legislation and movements, on 
the other.20 
On the first front—about the courts—I am halfway convinced.  Let’s 
start, however, with a deflationary proposal.  Looking back at the last two 
decades or so of touchstone cases, it seems to me that the “liberal” votes in 
favor of federal power and government permission to structure elections 
and economic relations in an equitable fashion would likely add up in the 
same way even if the Justices had switched from the powers-and-
permission language of post-New Deal jurisprudence to the legislative-
duties language associated with democracy of opportunity.  F&F don’t 
seem to imagine legislative duties as being judicially enforceable, so the 
posture of cases seems likely to remain the same in future—hung on the 
question, “Can the government do this?”—and both New Deal and 
democracy of opportunity vocabularies seem likely to take Justices to the 
same answers, at least as long as liberal Justices are basically pro-
Washington and pro-equality, which doesn’t seem a stretch. 
But what I have just said is the narrowest way to understand the issue.  
I doubt it covers all the ground.  New cases will arise, and the nature and 
 
20. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 12) (seeking to revive a 
constitutional discourse that recognizes the important constitutional role of courts but also 
prioritizes substantive, national debates over what it means to have an appropriate political 
economy). 
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stakes of those cases may depend, in part, on the language the Justices have 
been using to that point.  History really is surprising; it does not just seem 
that way in hindsight.  F&F’s language might prepare us for welcome 
surprises, or avert unwelcome ones. 
F&F are especially interesting when they turn to the interpretation of 
certain framework statutes, notably in labor law, arbitration, election law, 
and antitrust.  They treat these statutes, entirely convincingly, as central to 
the achievement of democracy of opportunity under modern economic 
conditions.21  This significantly affects the strength that, say, First 
Amendment challenges to these statutes should carry: the statutes 
themselves have constitutional weight. 
Setting aside constitutional challenges for the moment, it is equally 
important in the realm of statutory interpretation not to allow such 
foundational statutes to be misused to concentrate and reinforce private 
economic power.  Of course, this has happened in both antitrust and 
arbitration.22  This is really valuable: to understand not only that the scheme 
of law at the core of our idea of a democratic economy is mainly statutory, 
but also that it is constitutionally important to interpret and preserve these 
statutes in a certain way.  I’d note that the attitude being recovered here is 
really a mid-twentieth century one, as F&F show in recalling Justice 
Frankfurter’s view of labor law.23  Justices who accepted the post-New Deal 
role for constitutional courts nonetheless entirely understood the 
constitutional stakes of these statutes.24  The “Great Forgetting” took a 
while, and it may be hard to date convincingly. 
IV. Beyond the Courts: Political Movements and Legislators 
Now let’s turn away from the courts.  As F&F say, much of the work 
of their constitutional program needs doing by movements and legislators.  
Here it’s interesting to reflect that there are ways of describing the long 
tradition of democratic political economy that put much less emphasis on 
the Constitution than F&F do.  There are the many progressive criticisms of 
the Constitution’s democracy-impeding design—not least Woodrow Wilson 
 
21. See id. (manuscript at 77–90) (discussing the intersections between the democracy of 
opportunity and modern labor law, arbitration law, election law, and antitrust law). 
22. See id. (manuscript at 87–89) (arguing the Supreme Court has reinterpreted the Federal 
Arbitration Act beginning in the 1980s to allow forced arbitration, which has greatly benefitted 
large corporations and inhibited antitrust actions). 
23. See id. (manuscript at 82–84) (demonstrating that Justice Frankfurter did not believe that 
the First Amendment exempted workers from contributing to unions’ political spending if the 
workers objected to their political aims). 
24. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 114–21 (1991) (discussing the 
emergence of the New Deal Court’s “rational basis” doctrine in Carolene Products, which granted 
deference to the regulatory legislation, and has since been treated with the same respect by courts 
as the “freedom of speech”). 
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and Herbert Croly’s.25  I am not well qualified to parse the intellectual 
history of the New Deal, but despite Roosevelt’s occasional use of 
constitutional language, the Croly–Wilson view—that the spirit of 
democratic politics was nailed to the cross of constitutional structure, in 
Roberto Unger’s bloody image—mattered a lot in the ferment that produced 
that great wave of reform.26  Aziz Rana’s in-progress manuscript on 
nonconstitutionalist movements on the American Left cuts a very different 
path than F&F’s through abolitionism, labor radicalism, and the twentieth 
century.27  And today, as it happens, a serious candidate for the Democratic 
Party’s nomination, who comes as close to the democracy of opportunity 
tradition as any major national politician in decades, has more to say about 
the Scandinavian model of social democracy than about any specifically 
constitutional source of his program.28  In these ways, the prospects for a 
more democratic political economy today hark back more to the 
international links that Daniel Rodgers details in his great history of 
Progressive reform, Atlantic Crossings, than to any version of the 
Constitution.29 
All of this leads to the question of what it means to call a political 
program constitutional.  It seems to me that F&F’s proposal is basically 
rhetorical.  I don’t mean it is just about marketing a legislative agenda, but I 
do want to highlight a couple of contrasts with other kinds of claims.  I 
don’t think their historical recovery invokes a historically oriented theory of 
constitutional authority, in which a past sense of the Constitution would 
bind the present just because it is the past sense of the Constitution.  That is, 
I don’t think that, if it could be shown by the criteria they use that a 
libertarian reading of constitutional political economy were stronger than 
 
25. See, e.g., HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 40–47 (1914) (arguing the 
founders were distrustful of democracy, which manifested itself in inhibitions to the American 
political system); WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF 
THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 46–54 (1918) (arguing the Constitution must evolve to 
continuously meet the present challenges that government is faced with rather than have 
government be static in the same form as originally established by the Constitution). 
26. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: 
ANOTHER TIME, A GREATER TASK 47 (2015) (depicting legal institutions as the cross upon which 
society’s interests and ideals are crucified); ERIC ALTERMAN & KEVIN MATTSON, THE CAUSE: 
THE FIGHT FOR AMERICAN LIBERALISM FROM FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT TO BARACK OBAMA 5–8 
(2012) (tracing FDR’s New Deal to the liberal philosophies of Herbert Croly and Woodrow 
Wilson). 
27. See generally AZIZ RANA, THE RISE OF THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2018) (on file 
with author). 
28. Jedediah Purdy, Bernie Sanders’s New Deal Liberalism, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/bernie-sanderss-new-deal-socialism 
[https://perma.cc/5H4W-NZLG]. 
29. See generally DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A 
PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998) (analyzing the “North Atlantic economy” and discussing the exchange 
of politics and ideas throughout the North Atlantic among countries who had been tied together by 
trade and capitalism). 
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F&F allow, they would change their view of what judges or citizens should 
do. 
This point about their theory of constitutional authority also suggests 
something about their theory of constitutional meaning: as it’s now laid out, 
it doesn’t have an error criterion.  There’s nothing you could show F&F 
about text, structure, or history that would make them say—whatever their 
theory of constitutional authority—“Well, you’re right: I was wrong about 
that old Constitution!” 
Now, all this is great, and what I am saying is ground clearing, not 
hostile criticism.  F&F, I take it, are in the broad church of Protestant 
constitutionalism that recognizes that all the major concepts in the 
constitutional tradition are essentially contested, and that the terms in which 
they get contested are some of the major lineaments and bounds of 
American identity and political possibility—which are also essentially 
contested.  The criteria of successful argument are pragmatic and 
democratic, which is also to say that they are resolved in terms of history, 
not in terms of concepts.  All constitutional argument is gambling with your 
face toward the future and muttering into the ears of fellow citizens.  
Although we lawyers and law professors have our own professional 
orientation in this hurly-burly (and, perhaps, certain kinds of competence), 
it would be priestly obscurantism to pretend to stand outside it, navigating 
with hermeneutic astrolabes. 
V. What Constitutional Language Can Do for Political Reform 
So, what does it mean—in these democratic and pragmatic terms—to 
talk about anti-oligarchy and an inclusive middle-class economy as 
constitutional issues?  Here are the stakes as far as I can make them out. 
First, because the Constitution is the basic political document of the 
country, the idea of constitutional political economy emphasizes the 
interplay between democratic equality and self-rule, on the one hand, and 
economic order on the other.  The insistence that democracy has an 
economic dimension is at the very heart of this argument, and talking about 
the economy’s constitutional meaning takes us directly to that intersection.  
In a time when economic argument gets relentlessly tugged in technocratic 
directions by the gravitational force of the economics profession—even 
among progressives—the importance of this move is hard to exaggerate.30  
Of course, one could also just talk about a democratic economy, or a fair 
 
30. See, e.g., Thomas E. Flores, Never Mind the General, Here Come the Technocrats, 
SYMPOSIUM MAGAZINE (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.symposium-magazine.com/never-mind-the-
generals-here-come-the-technocrats/ [https://perma.cc/52XG-69U8] (describing the rise of 
technocrats to high political office following economic crises). 
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economy, as our leading social democrat tends to do;31 but talking about the 
constitution keeps the political character of the stakes in view. 
Second, constitutional language points backward in time, and therefore 
to continuities of argument and aspiration over centuries.  This strikes me as 
valuable in a forgetful culture.  The parallels between the laissez-faire 
jurisprudence of the first and second Gilded Ages, or between radical free 
labor and the welfare state, are no doubt easy to exaggerate, but I would 
rather see them exaggerated than forgotten.  They are lessons in recurrent 
patterns of political economy, in its empirical and its theoretical 
dimensions: how power accumulates, how its apologists justify it, and how 
it may be resisted. 
Third, and speaking more to our special training, constitutional 
language calls attention to political economy as an object of adjudication.  
At the very least, this may help to avert unpleasant surprises at the Supreme 
Court, such as the innovations in Commerce Clause and Spending Power 
doctrine that set Obamacare somewhat back on its heels.32  Better—coming 
back to an earlier observation—it equips judges and advocates for 
understanding the importance and potentially interconnected coherence of 
the statutes that halfway secure a half-decent economy.  The New Deal 
constitution of powers, permissions, and inclusion would have been enough 
if the mid-century economy of widely shared prosperity and growing social 
provision had kept on trucking.  It didn’t.  Laissez-faire jurisprudence is 
back in neoliberal form, and judges and scholars need to engage these 
themes directly. 
Last, speaking in constitutional language does, as F&F say early in 
their manuscript, add an exclamation point—and not just any exclamation 
point, but one that sounds in that old register of American commonality.  
This is one of the ways that Americans have said to one another: “These 
problems are your problems, whether you want them or not; these 
principles have a claim on you, whether or not you would have chosen 
them.”  Recently, from Benedict Anderson to Ta-Nehisi Coates, we have 
been getting essential lessons in how these “imagined communities” are 
artificial and, inasmuch as they are tied to hierarchy, exclusion, and 
exploitation, also fraudulent.33  True.  But the imagined constitutional 
community is also one of the ways our movements and prophets call power 
 
31. Purdy, supra note 28. 
32. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, S. Ct. 2566, 2602–04, 2608 (employing an 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause and Spending Power that enabled states to opt out of the 
Medicaid expansion called for by the Affordable Care Act). 
33. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6–7 (rev. ed. 2006) (explaining the concept of an imagined 
community); TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 6–7 (2015) (observing that a 
“government of the people” is divided by hierarchy). 
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to account and draw ordinary people out of their parochial and self-
concerned little carapaces. 
A part of me wants to conclude: “That is nothing to set aside lightly.”  
The sentence writes itself from the rhythm of what precedes it.  But another 
part wants to say: “These aspects of democratic life are too important to 
mystify with constitutional formulas and encrust with the barnacles of an 
often terrible history.”  (My rationalist side lacks a way with metaphor.  
Unsurprisingly.)  These are, basically, my inner Burke—prizing as a 
precious achievement the language in which Americans have sometimes 
moved one another by appeal to principle—and my inner Bentham—calling 
for more light (that is actually Goethe on his deathbed, but never mind) and 
disdaining all myth and historical moss.  I tend slightly to Burke, but I want 
to highlight the respective force of both alternatives. 
VI. Perils of Constitutional Language 
In that spirit, let’s list the hazards of constitutional language, which are 
largely corollaries of the advantages.  First, it tends to nationalize responses 
to the transnational challenges of inequality and the erosion of democracy.  
Internationalism—communist, reformist, and everything else—
characterized much of the Progressive politics of the First Gilded Age, 
which was also an era of economic globalization and shared crises.34  
Maybe that is the direction in which we should move now.  Maybe 
constitutional language directs our attention to precedents when we should 
be more interested in models and what allies offer today. 
Second, the constitutional register may reduce our interest in historical 
allies who were themselves not interested in, or were critical of, the 
Constitution.  (As I mentioned earlier, this is the vein that Aziz Rana is now 
mining.)35  Yet they might have much to teach us. 
Third, attention to constitutional themes will inevitably involve us in 
motivated historical interpretation.  Looking across the room, not just for 
our friends, but for people and events we can recast as friends, always risks 
crossing from being intellectually generative to being intellectually 
distortive.  Lawyers’ interpretation of history, like politicians’, seems able 
to handle only a modest dose of the full picture.  And there may be ironic 
political costs, too.  Rana and others have argued recently that the struggle 
for racial equality has suffered setbacks that began, partly, in embracing the 
Spooner-and-Lincoln-through-King “redemptive” view of the Constitution 
 
34. Charles E. Orser Jr., Why the Gilded Age . . . and Why Now?, 16 INT’L J. HIST. 
ARCHAEOLOGY 623, 625 (2012) (describing characteristic features of the First Gilded Age and the 
connections between the First Gilded Age and the present). 
35. See RANA, supra note 27 (manuscript at 47–63). 
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that emphasized the egalitarian potential of old principles and obscured the 
depth and persistence of political-economic inequality.36 
Finally, there is the double-sided character of American commonality 
itself.  In a time when we’re reminded every week of the exclusion and 
subordination both within and outside modern polities—from racialized 
police violence37 to refugee crises38 to the revival of herrenvolk nationalism 
in the Republican primaries39—ideas like citizenship, which are touchstones 
of democratic commonality, have lost some of their all-in-it-together sheen 
and come under suspicion of being halfway lies inside the borders and stiff-
arms outside against the unwelcome. 
My own suspicion is that the modern state and its democratic politics 
remain the field where we need to fight out these issues, albeit with 
transnational movements and the goal of ultimately building international 
egalitarian frameworks that match the scale of the global economy.  For this 
reason, I think F&F are right to bring us back to this essentially contested 
ground, with all its perennial, new, and intensified problems.  My cautions 
are intended to highlight what some of that contestation looks like just now. 
 
 
36. See id. 
37. See Aaron Blake, The Vast Majority of African Americans Say Police Unfairly Target 
Them, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/08/11/in-ferguson-an-all-to-familiar-recipe-for-racial-discord 
[https://perma.cc/SM87-ZSMQ?type=image] (discussing racially charged police violence). 
38. See Rod Nordland, A Mass Migration Crisis, and It May Yet Get Worse, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/world/europe/a-mass-migration-crisis-and-
it-may-yet-get-worse.html [https://perma.cc/K47S-HESK] (discussing the displacement of 
60 million refugees). 
39. See Eliza Collins, David Duke: Voting Against Trump Is ‘Treason to Your Heritage’, 
POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/david-duke-trump-219777 
[https://perma.cc/XY7W-UHKW] (reporting on David Duke’s support of Donald Trump’s 
candidacy). 
